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ALL ROADS LEAD TO PROPERTY: PASHUKANIS, CHRISTIE AND THE 
THEORY OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
 
R Koen 
1 Introduction 
 
The name of Evgeny Pashukanis, the Bolshevik jurisprudent, is linked umbilically to 
the so-called commodity form theory of law. In his Law and Marxism Pashukanis 
develops a general theory of law which turns upon the relationship between the 
commodity form and the legal form. The fundamental postulates of the general 
theory are, firstly, that the legal form is the analytical fulcrum of the general theory 
of law, and secondly, that the commodity form is the key to the analysis of the legal 
form. Law and Marxism, which first appeared almost ninety years ago, continues to 
occupy pride of place in the Marxist analysis of the law. Indeed, if there is a classical 
Marxist theory of law it is the so-called commodity form theory of law.1 
 
The name of Nils Christie, the Norwegian criminologist, features foremost in any 
consideration of the theoretical foundations of the restorative justice movement. In 
his seminal Conflicts as Property he proposed a theory of criminal justice which since 
has come to be identified constitutionally with restorative justice. Despite the fact 
that it makes no express reference to restorative justice, Conflicts as Property is 
easily the most quoted single piece in the extensive corpus of restorative literature. 
It is considered to be "classic" and "paradigmatic"2 and its arguments have achieved 
the status of "a modern orthodoxy amongst RJ3 supporters".4 Before any other work, 
                                                 
  Raymond Koen. LLM, PhD (UCT). Associate Professor and Chair, Department of Criminal Justice 
and Procedure, Faculty of Law, University of the Western Cape. E-mail: rkoen@uwc.ac.za. 
1 See Balbus "Commodity Form and Legal Form" 88, who submits that: "Almost all subsequent 
Marxist work on the law is, unfortunately, a regression from the standard established by 
Pashukanis's pioneering effort." 
2 Hudson "Victims and Offenders" 177. 
3  Restorative justice. 
4 Ashworth "Is Restorative Justice the Way Forward" 171. See Wright Justice for Victims and 
Offenders 54: "Few contributions have been as widely quoted in the literature on mediation as 
the Norwegian Professor Christie's lecture in Sheffield in 1976, Conflicts as Property." See also 
Johnstone "Introduction to Part A" 24: "Christie's paper is rightly regarded as essential reading 
for anybody wishing to understand the restorative justice perspective." Bottoms "Some 
Sociological Reflections on Restorative Justice" 82, 80 fn 2 refers to "this key foundational text" 
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it may be considered to contain the fundamental theoretical premises of restorative 
justice.5 
 
This contribution constitutes a hypothetical engagement of sorts between 
Pashukanis and Christie. It proceeds from the two-handed premise that Pashukanis 
is the premier Marxist theoretician of law and that Christie is the doyen of restorative 
justice theory. The primary objective of the essay is to develop a Pashukanist 
perspective on the theory of restorative justice, and it seeks to achieve this objective 
by reading Christie's theoretical insights against the core propositions of the 
commodity form theory of law. 
 
2 Pashukanism in brief 
 
For Pashukanis, the Marxist general theory of law had to be a theory of the legal 
form. Of course, he was alive to the class content of law. However, he warned about 
the inadequacy of a content-driven theory of law and was concerned to comprehend 
why legal relations take the form they do.6 In other words, his project was to 
analyse law qua law. Thus he provides a form-based delineation of the Marxist 
general theory: 
 
The general theory of law may be defined as the development of the most 
fundamental and abstract juridical concepts, such as 'legal norm', 'legal relation', 
'legal subject' and so on.7 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
and concludes that: "The subsequent major influence of Christie's paper would have been 
predicted by very few of those who first heard it. It was initially regarded as an extremely 
interesting intellectual argument, but one that was unlikely to have much subsequent practical 
impact. How wrong first impressions can be!" Even Braithwaite Restorative Justice and 
Responsive Regulation 11, the most prolific writer on restorative justice, considers Christie's to 
be "the most influential text of the restorative tradition". 
5 Christie's is a theory of comprehensive, as opposed to partial, restorative justice. Partial 
restorative justice is a pale fraction of comprehensive restorative justice. Whereas the latter was 
conceptualised as an alternative to criminal justice, the former has been fashioned as an adjunct 
thereto. Comprehensive restorative justice represents a radical departure from and a decisive 
theoretical rupture with the established presumptions and practices of criminal justice. 
Throughout this essay, any unqualified reference to restorative justice should be understood as a 
reference to the comprehensive version. 
6 Pashukanis Law and Marxism 55. 
7 Pashukanis Law and Marxism 47. 
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The Marxist general theory of law had to take the legal form seriously. Indeed, it 
had to be constructed in terms of the legal form, for without recourse to the 
morphology of law, the nature of law itself remains a mystery.8 
 
Pashukanis discerned that the elaboration of the general theory of law had to be 
derived from the fundamental categories of Marxist political economy, and in 
particular the commodity.9 He proposed that the attributes of the commodity held 
the key to the materialist analysis of the legal form, declaring his "basic thesis" to be 
that "the legal subject of juridical theories is very closely related to the commodity 
owner".10 
 
Both the commodity and the commodity owner make their appearance with the 
world-historic transition from production for use to production for exchange. Both 
are born of the triumph of exchange value over use value as the motif of human 
production. They come into existence when the raison d'être of human labour shifts 
from its aboriginal concern with use and sustenance to the historical artifice of 
exchange and market transactions. Pashukanis understood, as did Marx before him, 
that law was the necessary concomitant of the development of the commodity 
economy. Custom had been adequate to regulate social relations within the natural 
economy; law was required to deal with the social relations of the exchange 
economy. 
 
At the same time, therefore, that the product of labour becomes a commodity 
and a bearer of value, man acquires the capacity to be a legal subject and a 
bearer of rights.11 
 
In other words, the legal form was the homologue of the commodity form, both 
emerging from the break-up of the natural economy. The historical process whereby 
production for exchange superseded production for use was simultaneously the 
process whereby legal relations supplanted customary relations. 
                                                 
8 See Miéville Between Equal Rights 2. 
9 Pashukanis Law and Marxism 64. 
10 Pashukanis Law and Marxism 39. 
11 Pashukanis Law and Marxism 112. 
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It was Marx who had originated the notion of a symbiosis between commodity and 
legal forms and of the process of commodity exchange presupposing the 
transfiguration of commodity owners into legal subjects, each invested with the 
same bundle of rights: 
 
It is plain that commodities cannot go to market and make exchanges of their 
own account. We must, therefore, have recourse to their guardians, who are 
also their owners … In order that these objects may enter into relation with each 
other as commodities, their guardians must place themselves in relation to one 
another, as persons whose will resides in these objects, and must behave in 
such a way that each does not appropriate the commodity of the other, and part 
with his own, except by means of an act done by mutual consent. They must 
therefore recognise in each other the rights of private proprietors. This juridical 
relation … is but the reflex of the real economic relation between the two. It is 
this economic relation that determines the subject-matter comprised in each 
such juridical act.12 
 
Miéville13 is right to identify this passage by Marx as crucial to the general theory of 
law formulated by Pashukanis. In it Marx demarcates precisely the material 
conditions of the evolution of the legal subject as bearer of rights. Importantly, the 
exchange economy is predicated upon the principle of equivalence. In other words, 
it is structured in terms of relations of equality between commodity owners, and 
such equality is achieved when the commodity owner is endowed with legal 
subjectivity. Thus, the development of exchange relations depends upon the 
juridification of human relations. Juridification is the dividing line between exchange 
and appropriation. Marx14 explains: 
 
Although individual A feels a need for the commodity of individual B, he does not 
appropriate it by force, nor vice versa, but rather they recognise one another 
reciprocally as proprietors, as persons whose will penetrates their commodities. 
Accordingly, the juridical moment of the Person enters here … No one seizes 
hold of another's property by force. Each divests himself of his property 
voluntarily. 
 
Thus, in the exchange economy the legal subject is the alter ego of the commodity 
                                                 
12 Marx Capital 88. 
13 See Miéville Between Equal Rights 87. 
14 Marx Grundrisse 243. 
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owner, and the legal form is the necessary copula of the commodity form.15 
 
In world-historic terms, juridification, or the transformation of human relations into 
legal relations, is synchronised with commodification, or the transformation of the 
products of human labour from use values into exchange values. In this regard, 
rights in law are homologous to value in political economy. Both pivot upon 
equalisation and both are central to the demise of the natural economy and the 
development of the commodity economy. Thus, Pashukanis16 concludes that: 
 
The legal relation between subjects is simply the reverse side of the relation 
between products of labour which have become commodities. 
 
In terms of the Marxist general theory of law, then, the nature of the commodity 
holds the key to the nature of law, and the juridical as the site of equality is 
indispensable to the smooth operation of the market as the site of commodity 
exchange. In a word, the legal subject is the juridical correlate of the commodity 
owner, and the legal form is the commodity form juridified. 
 
The capitalist mode of production, as a mode of generalised commodity production 
and exchange, is the apogee of the commodity economy. Indeed, the commodity is 
the elemental cell of the market economy, and concentrates in itself all the elements 
of capitalist social relations of production. Unsurprisingly, then, the legal form attains 
the apex of its development and the legal subject comes of age under capitalism. 
And whereas law began its evolution in the pre-capitalist epoch, mature law is 
categorically bourgeois law.17 The bourgeoisie is the only ruling class in history which 
has embraced a juridical worldview, comprehending law to be the organisational axis 
of human relations.18 The juridical world outlook is the ideological expression of the 
political economy of the commodity and is the most appropriate ideational 
expression of the class interests of the bourgeoisie. It was, according to Engels, the 
                                                 
15 Pashukanis Law and Marxism 38-39 readily acknowledged his debt to Marx. 
16 Pashukanis Law and Marxism 85. 
17 See Pashukanis Law and Marxism 40-45. 
18 See Engels "Lawyers' Socialism" 598. 
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theological worldview secularised.19 It enabled the bourgeoisie to present the 
commodification and sale of labour-power as transactions between legal equals. The 
economic exploitation and political oppression of the proletariat were secreted 
behind their juridical forms of equality and right. 
 
In sum, the Pashukanist general theory of law is a theory of law as form. It derives 
the legal form from the commodity form and comprehends legal subjectivity as the 
crucial juridical criterion of the commodity economy. It identifies the juridification of 
social relations with the development of capitalism and considers bourgeois law to 
be the apotheosis of the evolution of law as form. True to his Marxist convictions, 
Pashukanis produced a general theory of law founded in a "materialist interpretation 
of legal regulation as a specific historical form".20 
 
3 Pashukanism and criminal justice 
 
Although Pashukanis acknowledged readily that his theory of law was rooted 
historically in private law, specifically the law of contract,21 he always conceived of 
and presented it as a general theory, applicable across the various fields of law.22 He 
posited that even criminal law, which has no prima facie links to the commodity 
form, is governed also by the principle of equivalence.23 Indeed, Pashukanis24 
classified this principle as the "juridical soul" of criminal proceedings,25 and 
considered that: 
 
the characterisation 'criminal law' becomes utterly meaningless if this principle of 
the equivalent relation disappears from it. 
 
He locates the principle in the notion that a crime is a particular form of contract. It 
is a retrospective contract: 
                                                 
19 Engels "Lawyers' Socialism" 598. 
20 Pashukanis Law and Marxism 54. 
21 See Pashukanis Law and Marxism 121. 
22 See Lipson "Is there a Marxist Theory of Law?" 192; Norrie 1982 Int'l J Soc L 434. 
23 Pashukanis Law and Marxism 168 classifies the principle of equivalence as the "first truly juridical 
idea". 
24 Pashukanis Law and Marxism 168. 
25 Pashukanis Law and Marxism 177. 
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Felony can be seen as a particular variant of circulation, in which the exchange 
relation, that is the contractual relation, is determined retrospectively, after 
arbitrary action by one of the parties.26 
 
A crime is a unilateral rejection of the principle of equivalence. It is not an act of 
exchange but of appropriation in which the offender strong-arms the victim into a 
relation which is completely one-sided. In this sense, a crime may be comprehended 
as an attack upon the legal form itself. 
 
The offender wishes to operate outside the parameters of the legal form. The 
criminal law exists to ensure that the offender does not enjoy the fruits of his 
violation of the principle of equivalence. It deploys the power of the state to negate 
the power which the offender enjoys in relation to the victim, and to secure 
reciprocation for the victim from the offender. To this end, the offender is put to 
terms ex post facto. He has had his satisfaction. Now, in the face of the power of 
the state, he is constrained to perform his side of a bargain which he has imposed 
arbitrarily upon his victim. The crime has desecrated the principle of equivalence. 
The criminal law operates to rescue the principle by construing the crime as a 
contractual obligation which the offender has to meet retrospectively. 
 
For Pashukanis, punishment is the means by which the offender's infringement of 
the principle of equivalence is countermanded. The criminal sanction is the 
performance due by the offender under the enforced contract which he has 
concluded with the victim. If crime is the violation of the principle of equivalence 
then punishment is its vindication. The offender has to pay for the harm he has 
caused, and the payment must be commensurate with the degree of harm suffered 
by the victim. In this context, the criminal sanction becomes "a form of exchange, a 
peculiar form of circulation, which has its place alongside 'normal' commercial 
circulation".27 
 
                                                 
26 Pashukanis Law and Marxism 168. Melossi and Pavarini Prison and the Factory 2 refer to this 
formulation as "the famous thesis of Pashukanis". 
27 Pashukanis Law and Marxism 176. 
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Historically, the form of punishment in which criminal justice has summated is 
imprisonment, that is, the exchange of a determinate portion of the offender's 
freedom, measured in time, for the harm his crime has caused the victim.28 The 
prison sentence is the embodiment of equivalence in punishment and is an 
extrapolation of that attribute which is at the heart of the value of every commodity, 
namely, labour time. In the same way as the value of a commodity is determined by 
abstract human labour time, so the criminal sanction in the commodity economy is 
delineated in terms of deprivation of abstract freedom for a designated period of 
time.29 The prison term is the penal materialisation of the principle of equivalent 
requital.30 It is the paradigmatic means by which the state is able to recover the 
juridical relation which the crime has infracted, and to secure the preservation of the 
legal form. The other forms of punishment (from the suspended sentence and 
periodical imprisonment, through the fine and property forfeiture, to correctional 
supervision and community service) are themselves also different expressions of the 
principle of equivalence. All are exchange transactions of one form or another, their 
principal differences relating to the extent to which they make patent the nexus 
between the penal regime and the commodity. The form of the criminal sanction is 
thus of little consequence. The essence of each form, whether custodial or non-
custodial, is given by the principle of equivalent requital.31 
 
From a Pashukanist perspective, both crime and punishment are thus as much 
subject to the principle of equivalence as is contract law or any other branch of 
private law. Such is the intended reach of the general theory of law. The rule of 
equivalence percolates throughout the law32 and governs criminal justice in 
                                                 
28 Pashukanis Law and Marxism 181. See also Melossi and Pavarini Prison and the Factory 184-185: 
"The idea of the deprivation of an abstractly determined quantity of liberty, as the dominant 
form of penal sanction can in fact only be realised with the advent of the capitalist system of 
production, that is, in that economic process which reduces all forms of social wealth to that 
most simple and abstract form of human labour measured in time." 
29 Pashukanis Law and Marxism 180-181. 
30 Pashukanis Law and Marxism 179. 
31 Pashukanis Law and Marxism 180. 
32 Jakubowski Ideology and Superstructure 49, who adheres to Pashukanis's central arguments, 
holds that: "Public law regulates the relations between the state and public institutions, and 
between these and the citizens; it serves to execute and protect private or civil law by means of 
the power of the state. The foundation of all these relations is still legal subjectivity and the 
recognition of the legal capacity of man, which give the relations of domination a general form." 
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substantially the same way as it governs contract.33 In other words, crime and 
punishment are subject to exactly the same juridical imperative as any legal 
transaction, namely, the principle of equivalence. 
 
4 The Christie thesis 
 
The notion that conflicts are forms of property is, needless to say, the centrepiece of 
Christie's argument.34 He constructs an aboriginal state of ownership in relation to 
conflicts, positing that every conflict begins its existence as the property of the 
parties who are directly involved in its creation. It belongs to them. However, 
precisely because they are forms of property, conflicts are capable of being stolen. 
Theft of conflicts is widespread in our "industrialised large-scale society".35 The 
original owners are dispossessed routinely of their conflicts, mainly by professional 
thieves but also by structural thieves.36 
 
Crimes fall within the purview of the Christie thesis in the sense that the conflict 
generated by the criminal conduct of the offender is valuable as property. Offender 
and victim are co-owners of the crime in which they are involved. It is their natural 
property and thus valuable to them. But it is also under constant threat of being 
appropriated. The main threat is posed by professional thieves in the form of 
lawyers and agents of the state who intervene to take or define criminal conflicts 
away from the original owners. The conflicts are either appropriated by lawyers or 
transformed into non-conflicts by treatment personnel.37 The point is that valuable 
property is either stolen or destroyed, and in both cases lost to its rightful owners. 
The result is an insoluble crisis of criminality, because the parties best equipped to 
solve it are disregarded as parties. Christie is concerned to return the stolen property 
                                                 
33 See Arthur "Editor's Introduction" 15; Stone 1985 Law and Society Review 44; Jakubowski 
Ideology and Superstructure 49. 
34 The reading of Christie which follows differs from most others in two ways: it is considerably 
more detailed and it relies upon a classical Marxist epistemology. 
35 Christie 1977 British Journal of Criminology 1. 
36 Professional thieves are lawyers, prosecutors and other criminal justice professionals, such as 
treatment personnel. Structural thieves are attributes of the social structure. Both these types of 
thieves are discussed below. 
37 Christie 1977 British Journal of Criminology 5. 
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to its rightful owners or, rather, to halt its theft, so that the owners are able to deal 
with it as they see fit. He wishes to see the direct parties being restored their 
proprietary rights to and interests in their conflicts, thereby acquiring the opportunity 
to benefit from them.38 
 
In addition to the professional theft of criminal conflicts, Christie identifies a category 
of structural theft. Such theft arises from the "changes in the basic social structure" 
which have promoted the dispossession of the owners of the conflicts.39 These social 
changes are expressed in a bifurcated process of social segmentation. Segmentation 
according to space refers to the fact that in modern society we relate to one another 
as "roles, not as total persons".40 We migrate from role to role, in one-dimensional 
relationships, isolated from our fellows. This kind of segmentation is exacerbated by 
the "extreme degree of division of labour" characteristic of our societies.41 
Segmentation according to caste attributes refers to the segregation of people 
according to "biological attributes such as sex, colour, physical handicaps or the 
number of winters that have passed since birth".42 Of these biological attributes, age 
is the most important. 
 
Christie postulates that segmentation leads to three consequences in respect of 
conflicts: firstly, social life is depersonalised, reducing our ability to cope with 
conflicts and encouraging us to give them away; secondly, certain conflicts are 
destroyed prematurely, before they can develop properly;43 thirdly, certain conflicts 
are rendered invisible, concealed from public view and engagement.44 Social 
segmentation thus entails the theft of criminal conflicts, as they are disowned, 
destroyed or disguised under the impact of the structural organisation of modern 
                                                 
38 Christie 1977 British Journal of Criminology 7. 
39 Christie 1977 British Journal of Criminology 5. 
40 Christie 1977 British Journal of Criminology 5. 
41 Christie 1977 British Journal of Criminology 5. 
42 Christie 1977 British Journal of Criminology 5. 
43 This applies especially to crimes against people's honour, which are highly personal, but which 
have decreased significantly in contemporary societies. 
44 This applies to crimes by the powerful against the weak, for example, wife- and child-abuse, and 
crimes by large organisations against individual victims. 
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society.45 
 
Thus, Christie constructs a theory of restorative justice which pivots upon the idea 
that the criminal episode entails non-material proprietary configurations which are 
fundamental to its resolution. It is a theory of restorative justice in which property 
features as an archetype. Christie's thesis is both remarkable and subversive. It is 
remarkable for intruding the idea of property into the question of crime and 
punishment. It is subversive in its implications for the traditionally public character of 
the criminal justice system. It amounts to a frontal assault upon the legitimacy of 
that system. Christie is arguing, essentially, that the criminal justice system, 
supposedly designed to resolve and prevent crime, itself has been constructed on 
the basis of the crime of theft. In other words, the criminal justice system is a 
product of the crisis of criminality it purports to solve. It is implicated in the crisis. 
The answer to this crisis, according to Christie, is to put an end to the theft, both 
professional and structural, of criminal conflicts and to restore them to the 
possession of their true owners, who, as owners, have the capacity to resolve them 
in a way in which no surrogate can. 
 
5 A different kind of justice 
 
Christie contrasts the modern western pathology of criminality to the way in which 
pre-modern, non-industrialised societies perceive and resolve their internal conflicts. 
He chooses Tanzania as an example, and proposes to "approach our problem from 
the sunny hillside of the Arusha province".46 He suggests that such societies are not 
plagued by the theft of criminal conflicts. They are structured in such a way as to 
                                                 
45 Most commentators focus upon the professional theft of conflicts in Christie's argument. The 
structural theft of these conflicts, which he analyses in some detail, is seldom if ever even 
acknowledged. This is unfortunate, because the structural thieves are as integral to his argument 
as are the professional thieves. Unlike so many of his followers, Christie appreciates the fact that 
human action invariably takes place within a determinate structural context. Structural theft is 
the milieu of professional theft. It is an analytical truism that the "industrialised large-scale 
society" which supplies the context of the Christie thesis is in fact contemporary capitalist 
society. And it is the structural theft of the property constituted by criminal conflicts which serves 
to locate his argument historically, in the socio-economic constitution of modern capitalism. 
Commentators who ignore or belittle the question of structural theft do Christie an injustice and 
can hardly claim to represent his position adequately. 
46 Christie 1977 British Journal of Criminology 2. 
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allow the immediate parties to participate directly in resolving all conflicts that arise. 
In other words, the segmentation which encourages the dispossession of the parties 
in modern societies does not exist in these societies. Also, there are no professionals 
to poach conflicts or to transform them into non-conflicts. All conflicts stay where 
they originated, with the parties who matter, to be resolved by them, with help from 
their fellows as and when necessary. 
 
Christie offers us the Tanzanian example as proof of the existence of an alternative 
way of doing justice, which does not involve the arrogation of conflicts either by 
legal professionals or by the structure of society. He goes further. He sees in the 
Tanzanian case an argument for the abandonment of the concept of criminal justice 
as we know it, that is, as a statist system, in favour of a civil law approach to 
criminal conflict resolution.47 He intimates that the solution to the crisis of criminality 
must involve a move away from the "modern criminal trial".48 The criminal justice 
system is biased structurally against the parties to a criminal conflict, especially the 
victim. He suggests that the interests of the parties would be served best if, instead 
of having to endure the indignities of the "modern criminal trial", they were able to 
enlist the resources and norms of the civil law in the resolution of their conflict. Such 
a system would have to be anti-statist, in the sense that the state would have no 
role as agent and party or, at best, a minor role.49 
 
The Tanzanian model, then, is offered as the key to the resolution of the 
contemporary crisis of criminality which plagues capitalist society. However, Christie 
no doubt realised that the simplistic transposition of a model from one material 
environment to another was a recipe for failure, even disaster. Any transposition had 
to be grounded theoretically, and had to be justifiable in relation to the structure of 
the recipient society. He thus needed a concept which would make the adoption of 
the Tanzanian model comprehensible in the context of contemporary capitalist 
societies and which rendered it adaptable to their structures. It is this consideration, 
                                                 
47 Christie 1977 British Journal of Criminology 3. 
48 Christie 1977 British Journal of Criminology 3. 
49 Like the structural theft of criminal conflicts, anti-statism is a crucial but hardly admitted aspect 
of Christie's theory of restorative justice. 
R KOEN   PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
 
200 / 392 
 
it is submitted, which underlies his construction of conflicts as property. The credo of 
property is the ruling orthodoxy of capitalist society. Its reach is extensive and 
colours virtually every transaction and relation of any significance. Under capitalism, 
to quote Macpherson's epigram, "all roads lead to property".50 Christie's conception 
of crime in proprietary terms comprehends this capitalist imperative, and provides 
the theoretical ratio which he required to endorse the Tanzanian model as an 
alternative to our statist criminal justice system. Re-defining criminal conflicts as 
forms of property was his chosen way of modernising the Tanzanian model, to meet 
the conditions of the contemporary world. 
 
Christie does not argue that the Tanzanians conceive of their conflicts as property. 
However, he does argue that the Tanzanian case constitutes a participatory "happy 
happening" compared with the dull, tedious and peripheral nature of the "non-
happening" that is the criminal trial in the western criminal justice system.51 In other 
words, he does not posit, expressly at any rate, any necessary historical connection 
between conflicts as property and courts as happenings. His construction of conflicts 
as property is bounded by the structural specificities of capitalism. It appears that 
Christie considers that in order to transform capitalist criminal justice into a 
happening, perhaps even a "happy happening", it is necessary to transform criminal 
conflicts into property. 
 
In capitalist society participation is a scarcity.52 The notion of criminal conflicts as 
property is, according to Christie, the key to resurrecting participation and 
reconstructing criminal justice as the "happy happening" it ought to be. For him, 
ownership is the route to participation, and all of us ought to have a proprietary 
stake in the criminal justice regime of modern society.53 Conflicts constitute valuable 
property because they afford their owners the opportunity to become directly 
involved in their resolution. For the purposes of their resolution, the natural 
proprietors of criminal conflicts are the victims, the offenders, and the affected 
                                                 
50 MacPherson Democratic Theory 121. 
51 Christie 1977 British Journal of Criminology 2. 
52 Christie 1977 British Journal of Criminology 7. 
53 Christie 1977 British Journal of Criminology 7. 
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community, all of whom are side-lined habitually by the professional and structural 
theft of their conflicts. 
 
Victims of crime become victims of the criminal justice system when they are 
dispossessed of their conflicts by lawyers in the form of state prosecutors and are 
prevented from participating meaningfully in their own cases.54 Victims thus need to 
be reinstated as parties proper in the criminal justice system. But, according to 
Christie, the victim as owner is a precondition for the victim as agent. In other 
words, victims will return to the centre of the criminal justice process only if the 
conflicts into which they have been drawn involuntarily are treated as their property, 
at least in part, to dispose of according to an arrangement which is negotiated by 
them, and not on their behalf by the state or its functionaries.55  
 
Christie reckons that the conquest of victimhood requires that victims be guaranteed 
substantive proprietary rights in the conflicts which have rendered them victims. 
Ultimately, he wants to see the establishment of a system of neighbourhood courts 
which are victim-oriented. The neighbourhood court would be a site: 
 
where the victim's situation was considered, where every detail regarding what 
had happened - legally relevant or not - was brought to the court's attention. 
Particularly important here would be detailed consideration regarding what could 
be done for him, first and foremost by the offender, secondly by the local 
neighbourhood, thirdly by the state.56 
 
All of this would be possible if the crime victim were transformed, via his ownership 
of his conflict, from an object into a subject of the criminal justice process. 
 
Christie57 argues that for offenders, also, the recognition of criminal conflicts as 
property entails opportunities to participate directly in reparative and healing 
endeavours: 
 
                                                 
54 Christie 1977 British Journal of Criminology 7-8. 
55 Christie 1977 British Journal of Criminology 11. 
56 Christie 1977 British Journal of Criminology 10. 
57 Christie 1977 British Journal of Criminology 9. 
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The offender gets a possibility to change his position from being a listener to a 
discussion - often a highly unintelligible one - of how much pain he ought to 
receive, into a participant in a discussion of how he could make it good again. 
The offender has lost the opportunity to explain himself to a person whose 
evaluation of him might have mattered. He has thereby also lost one of the most 
important possibilities for being forgiven. 
 
The offender, as begetter of the conflict, is given a stake in its resolution. He is 
invited to possess it as his own so that he can make a material contribution to 
righting that which he has disturbed. The offender is offered the chance to 
demonstrate the resolutive value of his proprietary rights in the conflict by applying 
them to the construction of a restorative response. The proprietary theory of 
criminal conflict thus is offered as the salvation of both the victim and offender. 
 
However, whereas victims are presumed to be willing proprietors, Christie accepts 
that offenders may be reluctant owners who "are perfectly willing to give away their 
property right to the conflict".58 However, he believes that an offender does not 
have the right to give away, deny, abandon or abrogate his proprietorship of his 
conflict.59 It is his, permanently and indissolubly. It is inalienable. If needs be, the 
offender must be compelled to act as the owner and to participate in the resolution 
of his conflict, "quite independently of his wishes".60 He will be an active owner, 
whether he likes it or not. He has no choice in the matter. He will be impressed into 
the making of a happening. 
 
For Christie, criminal law as practised in the western world has "reduced the victim 
to a nonentity and the offender to a thing".61 He seeks a criminal justice which is 
structured in terms of agency for both victims and offenders. To this end he refers 
us to the pre-industrial legal culture of village Tanzania as the representative of a 
system of conflict resolution which takes seriously the cares and concerns of the 
immediate parties. In such a system, both victim and offender come into their own. 
They are at the centre of the process of conflict resolution. It is their process. Others 
                                                 
58 Christie 1977 British Journal of Criminology 9. 
59 Christie 1977 British Journal of Criminology 9 fn 2 derives his position from John Locke's 
postulate that one possesses a proprietary right in one's own life which cannot be alienated. 
60 Christie 1977 British Journal of Criminology 9. 
61 Christie 1977 British Journal of Criminology 5. 
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are allowed to participate only as "resource-persons",62 to facilitate the process, but 
never to commandeer it. 
 
Christie takes his argument beyond victim and offender. He contends, further, that 
the appropriation of criminal conflicts by the state entails a significant loss also for 
society as a whole: 
 
But the big loser is us - to the extent that society is us. This loss is first and 
foremost a loss in opportunities for norm-clarification. It is a loss of pedagogical 
possibilities. It is a loss of opportunities for continuous discussion of what 
represents the law of the land.63 
 
Christie objects to the foreclosed nature of contemporary western legal systems, 
where parties typically are gridlocked into subservience to legal norms and legal 
arguments which may have little bearing on their real interests and which may show 
little comprehension of their real concerns. Once more he refers us to a "non-
western" system which is not as normatively exclusionary and hence not as 
affectively impervious to the immediate parties as ours. 
 
Maybe Barotse law ... is a better instrument of norm-clarification, allowing the 
conflicting parties to bring in the whole chain of old complaints and arguments 
each time. Maybe decisions on relevance and on the weight of what is found 
relevant ought to be taken away from legal scholars, the chief ideologists of 
crime control systems, and brought back for free decisions in the court-rooms.64 
 
He identifies a "further general loss". He suggests that the loss of "possibilities for 
personalised encounters" between victim and offender reinforces the misconceptions 
which each entertains of the other.65 The answer is to keep the state and its 
functionaries away from criminal conflicts. According to Christie, as civil society we 
are capable of dealing with criminal conflicts, treated as our property, without the 
interventionist assistance of criminal justice professionals. 
 
When all is said and done, Christie is petitioning for a criminal justice system that is 
                                                 
62 Christie 1977 British Journal of Criminology 12. 
63 Christie 1977 British Journal of Criminology 8, original emphasis. 
64 Christie 1977 British Journal of Criminology 8. 
65 Christie 1977 British Journal of Criminology 9. 
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radically different from that which we have in contemporary capitalist society. He is 
urging a system which is structured in terms of the concerns and expectations of the 
parties who are directly involved in the criminal episode, namely, the victim, the 
offender and the community. As already intimated, Christie champions a system of 
neighbourhood courts. In addition to being victim-oriented, these courts should also 
be lay-oriented. 
 
The ideal is clear; it ought to be a court of equals representing themselves. 
When they are able to find a solution between themselves, no judges are 
needed. When they are not, the judges ought also to be their equals.66 
 
This latter proposition necessarily entails the expulsion of the state and its 
functionaries from the larger part of the criminal justice process. Whenever 
professionals are involved, they should function only as resource persons. "They 
might help to stage conflicts, not take them over."67 Christie considers that we have 
much to learn from the legal systems of pre-modern, non-industrialised countries, 
where justice is fully participatory for those directly involved in conflict, and where 
access to justice is not stymied by the dominance of legal norms. He is eager to see 
that the criminal justice systems of contemporary industrialised societies be 
reconstructed along such participatory, non-juridical lines. 
 
Surprisingly, despite his theorising criminal conflicts in proprietary terms, nowhere 
does Christie provide a unitary definition of property. Sometimes he appears to 
understand property as private property. Thus he talks about the victim being 
dispossessed of "something that belonged to him";68 and of offenders giving away 
"their property right to the conflict".69 At other times, however, he expressly rejects 
the idea of conflicts as private property: 
 
One of the major ideas behind the formulation 'Conflicts as Property' is that it is 
neighbourhood-property. It is not private. It belongs to the system.70 
                                                 
66 Christie 1977 British Journal of Criminology 11. 
67 Christie 1977 British Journal of Criminology 12. 
68 Christie 1977 British Journal of Criminology 8. 
69 Christie 1977 British Journal of Criminology 9. 
70 Christie 1977 British Journal of Criminology 12. See also Christie 1977 British Journal of 
Criminology 11, where he speaks of conflicts as "property that ought to be shared". Crawford 
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It seems, then, that Christie subscribes to a hybrid notion of conflicts as property. 
The nature of the conflict as property is dependent upon the relevant owner. Christie 
identifies three co-owners: the victim, the offender and the community. A criminal 
conflict is private property insofar as it belongs to the victim and offender. It is not 
private insofar as it is community property, belonging to the system of 
neighbourhood courts which Christie proposes. 
 
On the face of it, the notion that a criminal conflict, as property, is simultaneously 
private and not private appears contradictory, even illogical. The conventional notion 
of property in the capitalist world is that it is private and that its private nature 
entails the exclusion of all non-owners from asserting proprietary rights over it or 
deriving advantage from it without the consent of the owner. Christie's property 
postulate certainly does not accord with this conventional wisdom, and deliberately 
so. His thesis is founded upon a proprietary form which is non-standard in the 
capitalist context, namely, common property. The notion that a criminal conflict is 
both community property and that it is the property of the victim and offender refers 
to a species of property which goes beyond the classic capitalist concept of property 
as private.71 Christie's apparent vacillation between conflicts as private property and 
neighbourhood property is an expression of the view that, under capitalism, common 
property too is an individual right. In other words, the common property which 
Christie envisages continues to be governed by the credo of capitalist individualism, 
in the sense that individuals have enforceable rights in it. Thus, whereas a criminal 
conflict may be the common property of the community, the victim and offender 
each stands as individual proprietor in relation to it. 
                                                                                                                                                        
"The State, Community and Restorative Justice" 104-105 relies upon this aspect of Christie's 
notion of property to contend that "a careful reading" of Christie shows that "he is not 
advocating a privatisation of disputes" and that "the state retains a vital role balancing the 
interests of the different parties". However, despite purporting to have read him carefully, 
Crawford has misread Christie. It seems that Crawford's "reading" has much more to do with his 
own support of partial restorative justice than with what Christie actually says. 
71 There is here a concurrence between Christie's position and the work of MacPherson Democratic 
Theory 133-136 who, at the time, was making similar submissions about capitalist property in 
general, arguing, inter alia, that it is not to be conceived solely as rights in material things and 
that it is not to be equated exclusively with private property. Christie acknowledges MacPherson 
in one of the three footnotes in Conflicts as Property and includes MacPherson's The Political 
Theory of Possessive Individualism in his list of references. 
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Such, then, is the Christie thesis, in which all roads lead to property. The solution to 
the capitalist crisis of criminality consists in a re-definition of criminal conflicts as 
property in the context of a localised criminal justice system which is structured 
according to the participatory desiderata characteristic of agrarian communities 
which, if not pre-capitalist, are located on the capitalist periphery. 
 
6 Christie pro Pashukanis 
 
Despite the mushrooming of restorative justice literature, very little of it is overtly 
theoretical, and Christie's notion of conflicts as property remains paramount in the 
theoretical domain of the restorative justice project. Certainly, there has been no 
other major theoretical advance since Christie's.72 The remainder of this essay will be 
concerned, therefore, to assess Christie's proprietary theory, as the prime 
epistemological precept of restorative justice, in relation to the basic tenets of 
Pashukanis's general theory of law. 
 
It will be recalled that Christie identifies two forms of the theft of criminal conflicts, 
namely the professional and the structural. The appropriation of criminal conflicts by 
prosecutors and other justice professionals is an index of the unavoidably statist 
character of criminal justice within the capitalist context. The professional thieves in 
question are functionaries of the capitalist state for which criminal justice resides 
within its exclusive bailiwick. Ironically, the professional theft of criminal conflicts to 
which Christie objects is the mode by which the state restores the principle of 
equivalence which the crime has sundered. When victims, offenders and the 
community are neglected in the modern criminal trial it is because the state is acting 
to vouchsafe the principle of equivalence as the central imperative of the criminal 
justice system. In other words, the process which Christie decries as the professional 
theft of criminal conflicts is an attribute of capitalist criminal justice. The deployment 
of the juridical apparatus of the state is necessary to ensure that the crime in 
                                                 
72 Braithwaite and Pettit Not Just Deserts did formulate a republican theory of restorative justice 
but its impact has been negligible in comparison to the influence which Christie's proprietary 
theory continues to command. 
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question does not remain a site of appropriation and inequality. The rule of 
equivalence by which the commodity economy lives and dies must be the existential 
leitmotif of its system of criminal justice also. 
 
However, Christie's condemnation of the professional theft of criminal conflicts is 
really a prologue to his theorising restorative justice in terms of a market in 
criminality, operating according to the laws which govern the market in 
commodities. Such a market is, archetypally, a private sphere, where participants 
meet as and are recognised inter se as equals. In other words, the principle of 
equivalence is not imposed, as it is by the state in the arena of criminal justice. Here 
it is an attribute of the restorative process. That process summates in the restorative 
sanction, which is supposed to express the principle of equivalence upon which 
restorative justice rests. Unlike the criminal sanction, it is not decided or fashioned 
by one party.73 It is a solution devised by victim and offender, facing each other as 
equals in the community. It is they, not the state, who decide what the offender 
should offer as quid pro quo for the harm suffered by the victim. The restorative 
process is conceived as a process of equalisation which repudiates the offender's 
assertion of priority. And the restorative sanction is the outcome of a transaction 
which the parties negotiate as equals according to market principles. Unlike the 
criminal sanction, the restorative sanction emerges naturally from an exchange 
between parties whose relationship is structured by the principle of equivalence. The 
criminal sanction is a compelled implementation of the ethos of the commodity 
economy whereas the restorative sanction is a celebration of that ethos.74 
 
Much of what Christie canvasses in his analysis of structural theft may be subsumed 
under the Marxist concept of alienation. Marxism holds that capitalist social relations 
                                                 
73 The criminal sanction amounts to an imposed equivalence, backed by the power of the state. As 
Pashukanis Law and Marxism 176-177 shows, it is the power of the state which stands behind 
the construction of the crime as a contract made by the offender, whether he intended it or not, 
and whether he wants it or not. It is in the face of the might of the state that the offender has 
no choice but to uphold his part of the bargain which he has thrust upon the victim unilaterally. 
74 The regular resort in many jurisdictions to negotiated criminal justice in the form of the so-called 
plea bargain does not undermine this proposition. Contrariwise, the plea bargain, in name and 
process and content, is a dispositive device which endorses the Pashukanist notion of a crime as 
a retrospective contract and which renders visible the homologous relation between the legal 
form and the commodity form under capitalist conditions. 
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of production have the effect of robbing people of crucial components of their 
human potentialities. People are estranged from one another, from the products of 
their labour and from themselves. The conditions of capitalist production and 
reproduction require that we be atomised psychologically, and that our relations with 
our fellow human beings be constructed according to our place in the division of 
labour, as determined by the exigencies of the world of generalised commodity 
production. In practice, this entails that we live our lives at an emotional distance 
from our fellows, in a one-dimensional universe, and that our social connections are 
denuded of human content. We are each of us reduced to an estranged abstraction 
of our potential selves.75 
 
When Christie describes the social segmentation which underlies the structural theft 
of conflicts, he is in effect describing the alienated social relations of the capitalist 
mode of production. He is not a Marxist and does not rely upon the concept of the 
mode of production as an analytical tool. Also, he prefers to comprehend the 
modern capitalist social divisions in caste rather than class terms, and within the 
caste system he foregrounds biological age over socio-economic factors. But he 
consciously links the theft of criminal conflicts to the structure of contemporary 
society. He tells us that it is the (capitalist) social structure which is responsible, in 
part at least, for the theft of criminal conflicts. This is a crucial insight, for it implies a 
crucial question: can halting the theft of criminal conflicts and hence solving the 
crisis of criminality occur within the structural parameters of our society? We shall 
return to this issue later. 
 
For Pashukanis, the legal form is the materialisation of the relations of commodity 
production, specifically of generalised commodity production. In other words, law 
proper is an attribute of the capitalist mode of production; the pre-capitalist modes 
of production were all pre-legal societies in the sense that none of them evinced a 
juridical worldview. Every legal system proper is founded upon the fundamental idea 
of the legal subject, as bearer of legal rights and duties, who is the motor force of 
the legal relation. The legal subject begins as a commodity owner and acquires his 
                                                 
75 See Ollman Alienation 131-135. 
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status as a subject in order to trigger the circulation of commodities. In other words, 
every legal subject is simultaneously a proprietor, at least of that unique value-
producing commodity, labour power. Legal subjectivity, then, comes into existence 
as the correlative of commodity exchange. It is, in this connection, an eminently 
private-law concept, structuring the circulation process according to the specificities, 
especially, of the law of contract and the law of property. The legal form is, in 
Pashukanis's terms, the conjunct of the commodity form, and the legal subject the 
conjugate of the commodity owner. Juridification and commodification are 
complements, both diachronic and synchronic, of each other. 
 
Christie does not make any reference to Pashukanis and his general theory of law. 
Yet, the theory of restorative justice which Christie propounds is, in many respects, 
remarkably affined to Pashukanis's position. Christie does not share Pashukanis's 
critique of the legal form. But he does show a strong intuitive grasp of the place 
occupied by the process of commodification in the constitution of the legal form. 
Christie, it will be recalled, is concerned with criminal justice in "industrialised large-
scale society" which, as already noted, amounts to a concern with capitalist criminal 
justice. And he argues for crimes in capitalist society to be redefined as non-material 
forms of property. However, given that capitalist society is a society of generalised 
commodity production governed by the legal regime of private property, it follows 
that Christie's argument for criminal conflicts to be comprehended as property forms 
may be taken as an argument for their commodification.76 Certainly, in the context 
of capitalism, the process of commodification is the key to the transformation, literal 
or metaphorical, of criminal conflicts into forms of property. 
 
Christie's conception of a comprehensive restorative justice which is free of the 
strictures and structures of the state is a revolutionary one in the context of the 
capitalist mode of production and its political exigencies. In this connection, his 
construction of criminal conflicts as property is an inspired piece of theorising. The 
nature of capitalist production requires a property regime which is not overly 
                                                 
76 See Pashukanis Law and Marxism 126: "Private property first becomes perfected and universal 
with the transition to commodity production, or more accurately, to capitalist commodity 
production." 
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encumbered by statist constraints. Hence, while capitalist property is sacrosanct and 
always under the overall protective aegis of the capitalist state, the rights of the 
owner to transact with his property as he sees fit are largely immune from state 
intervention or control. The owner enjoys more or less absolute dominion.77 It is this 
freedom of property, as an attribute of ownership, which is central to Christie's 
thesis. For it implies that the owners of a criminal conflict are legally entitled, qua 
owners, to dispose of it as they see fit, without reference to or without the oversight 
of the state. 
 
In the context of restorative justice it is the community to which the offender and 
victim, as owners, are accountable for the disposition of their criminal conflict. Its 
resolution is subject to community participation and supervision. However, it must 
be observed here that Christie does not conceive of the restorative community as a 
"mere" replacement for the state. His theory is properly anti-statist and allows no 
ready room for a sovereign public authority. It is true that community involvement 
imbues the restorative process with a public aspect, in the sense that it is open to 
public scrutiny and moderation. But that is not the same as having criminal 
dispositions decided by a public authority. Indeed, community participation in the 
restorative process is supposed to be an expression of the radically private character 
of that process. The community is able to become involved precisely because the 
state, as public power, has been ejected. If crime and punishment are to be dealt 
with in the concourse of the market, then the community is the market-place of 
restorative justice. It is the site where victim and offender, as men or women of 
property, as commodity owners, enter into an exchange transaction governed by the 
principle of equivalence according to which the market is structured. In this regard, 
the community is, to misquote Marx, a very Eden of equality.78 
                                                 
77 See MacPherson Democratic Theory 126: "Modern private property is indeed subject to certain 
limits on the uses to which one can put it: the law commonly forbids using one's land or 
buildings to create a nuisance, using one's goods to endanger lives, and so on. But the modern 
right, in comparison with the feudal right which preceded it, may be called an absolute right in 
two senses: it is a right to dispose of, or alienate, as well as to use; and it is a right which is not 
conditional on the owner's performance of any social function." 
78 The original statement by Marx Capital 172 reads as follows: "This sphere that we are deserting, 
within whose boundaries the sale and purchase of labour-power goes on, is in fact a very Eden 
of the innate rights of man." 
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From a Pashukanist perspective, Christie's position, even if encompassing a 
somewhat idiosyncratic notion of capitalist property, implies adherence to the 
process of commodification as its basic theoretical premise. The Christie thesis 
requires that restorative justice be theorised in terms of the extension of the process 
of commodification to criminal behaviour itself. Crime is, or must become, a 
commodity, albeit an intangible commodity. Of course, it is not being suggested here 
that Christie's advocating for crime to be treated as property implies that he 
consciously has embraced a Pashukanist position. What is indubitable, however, is 
that Christie's theoretical submissions confer credence upon Pashukanis's general 
theory of law, and place restorative justice squarely within the purview of that 
theory. Christie's work is primarily about grounding restorative justice theoretically. 
However, in elaborating his proprietary theory of restorative justice he grasps the 
truth of Pashukanis's basic argument that legal relations are a superstructural 
manifestation of commodity relations, and that the legal form is, at bottom, a 
proprietary form which is suffused with the ethos of the market.79 
 
Indeed, and despite their quite contrary origins and conclusions, Christie's idea of 
criminal conflict as property is a quite stunning vindication of Pashukanis's analysis 
of the legal form.80 In Christie we see a prominent and respected member of the 
non-Marxist criminological community proffering an analysis of crime which is 
spontaneously but uncannily Pashukanist in its essentials. And it is an analysis which 
has been validated by a significant proportion of the restorative justice community.81 
After Christie, the coin of Pashukanis's overall approach to the analysis of law has 
increased appreciably in value. Christie's achievement is that he discerned that the 
contemporary crisis of criminality had its material basis in the crisis of capitalism and 
fashioned a theory which comprehended the pivotal position occupied by proprietary 
relations in the political economy of capitalism. His achievement is all the more 
                                                 
79 The organic relationship between law and property seems to have been patent to most earlier 
political philosophers. Thus, for example, Bentham Theory of Legislation 113 says: "Property and 
law are born together and die together. Before laws were made there was no property; take 
away laws, and property ceases." The arguments of both Christie and Pashukanis thus are well-
grounded in the history of political philosophy. 
80 There are, of course, major differences between Pashukanis and Christie, which will be discussed 
below. 
81 See notes 2 and 4 above. 
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impressive in that he reached his conclusions, which are demonstrably Pashukanist 
in so many respects, without any overt reliance upon the analytical resources of 
Marxism. 
 
Christie's accord with the Pashukanist perspective encompasses not only the concept 
of crime but also that of punishment. Although Conflicts as Property contains 
nothing of substance in respect of the analysis of punishment, Christie's subsequent 
Limits to Pain makes it clear that he understands fully the principle of equivalent 
requital which founds the capitalist penal regime. Thus, he says: 
 
In penal law, values are clarified through a gradation of inflicting pain. The state 
establishes its scale, the rank-order of values, through variation in the number of 
blows administered to the criminal, or through the number of months or years 
taken away from him.82 
 
He understands also the connection between punishment and the commodity 
economy as an economy of labour time: 
 
It is correct that our prisons are by and large filled with poor people. We let the 
poor pay with the only commodity that is close to being equally distributed in 
society: time.83 
 
Christie clearly appreciates the true meaning of the notion of "doing time". And 
again, as with his analysis of crime, his pronouncements on state punishment have 
about them a palpably Pashukanist tenor. 
 
Of course, Christie would have state punishment emanating from the criminal trial 
be replaced by the restorative sanction fashioned in the restorative process. His 
trifurcated notion of property governs the restorative process. As proprietors, the 
offender and the victim are charged with negotiating an exchange according to 
which the offender will offer and the victim will accept such reparation as will allow 
them to relinquish ownership of the crime. They are equal participants in an 
exchange relation which consumes the crime. The community is the site of the 
                                                 
82 Christie Limits to Pain 94. 
83 Christie Limits to Pain 95. 
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transaction between victim and offender. They must face each other in the 
community. They must make their dealings subject to inspection by and involvement 
of the community. The community is, in this regard, the guardian of the principle of 
equivalence in the restorative process. Its participation ensures that the exchange 
between offender and victim is an equal one. The restorative process needs a milieu 
in which the parties will respect each other as equals. The community provides that 
milieu. The concerted tripartite transaction has the effect of using up the criminal 
episode. Things can then return to normal. And the principle of equivalence stands 
vindicated. 
 
The restorative sanction is the high-water mark of the restorative process. It is non-
punitive, aimed at effacing the crime and its consequences and restoring the status 
quo ante. Its construction and implementation determine the success or otherwise of 
the restorative process. In other words, the restorative sanction is concerned 
primarily to heal and repair what the crime has fractured and, as such, may be taken 
as the measure of restorative justice in practice. Christie's thesis makes apparent the 
way in which the credo of the commodity is inveigled in the formulation of the 
restorative sanction and the way in which the restorative process is configured in 
terms of the principle of equivalence. In relation to the restorative sanction, too, we 
see Christie importing an unequivocally if inadvertently Pashukanist flavour into the 
elaboration of his theory of restorative justice. 
 
It is well known that in their studies of the constitution of the primitive commune, 
Marx and Engels relied heavily upon the anthropological discoveries of Morgan.84 
Similarly, Lenin, in his analysis and critique of imperialism, made extensive use of 
the work of Hobson.85 Pashukanis was murdered by agents of Stalin some forty 
                                                 
84 See Morgan Ancient Society. Engels Origin of the Family 1 tells us that Morgan "in his own way 
had discovered afresh in America the materialistic conception of history discovered by Marx forty 
years ago". Also, Engels "Letter to Karl Kautsky" 347 records that: "Morgan has quite 
independently discovered the Marxian materialist conception of history within the limits 
prescribed by his subject and he concludes with directly communist propositions in relation to 
present day society." 
85 See Hobson Imperialism. Lenin "Imperialism" 176, 235 and 240 often praises "the non-Marxist 
Hobson", whose work he accepted as presenting "a very good and comprehensive description of 
the principal specific economic and political features of imperialism". The Bolshevik leader put 
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years before Christie's iconic 1976 lecture. However, it is arguable that Christie 
occupies a position in relation to Pashukanis which is comparable in many respects 
to that occupied by Morgan in relation to Marx and Engels, and Hobson in relation to 
Lenin. Certainly, it would not be remiss to say of Christie that in his analysis of the 
proprietary character of conflicts, he rediscovered the core elements of Pashukanis's 
materialist theory of law. Also, it would be entirely legitimate to say that the non-
Marxist Christie's comprehension of the constitutive features of the legal form has 
resulted in his fashioning a theory of restorative justice which is closely related to 
the commodity form. 
 
Pashukanis discerned virtually the same thing more than 50 years earlier, in his 
classification of a crime as a retrospective contract. For, inscribed in such a 
classification is the notion of an exchange relation which lies at the heart of the 
juridical idea of a contract. In other words, Pashukanis realised that, in the capitalist 
context, a crime is as much about commodity exchange as any other private-law 
transaction. Given that the commodity is the elemental form of capitalist property, it 
becomes evident that Pashukanis adhered to a decidedly proprietary notion of crime. 
More than half a century had to elapse before this Marxist postulate was affirmed 
publicly by an "independent" source in the shape of Christie's theory of restorative 
justice. It would appear that all roads indeed do lead to property. That is the 
capitalist way. Christie has proved Pashukanis. When Christie decided to theorise 
crimes as forms of property he was, needless to say, unaware of how close this 
would take him to Pashukanis. It took him as close as a non-Marxist can approach a 
Marxist position without actually embracing it. The proximity is such that the spirit of 
Pashukanis's general theory of law is embedded in the soul of Christie's proprietary 
theory of restorative justice. In a word, Christie has produced a commodity form 
theory of restorative justice. 
 
Christie appreciates the proprietary bias of contemporary bourgeois society and 
celebrates it as the cornerstone of the theory of restorative justice. As a Marxist, 
                                                                                                                                                        
greater store by Hobson's analysis of imperialism than that of Marxists such as Kautsky and 
Hilferding. 
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Pashukanis comprehends fully the centrality of property in the political economy of 
capitalism, and theorises it, in its unadulterated commodity form, as the key to the 
analysis of the legal form. There can, in this regard, be no gainsaying the likelihood 
that, had Pashukanis been required to analyse restorative justice in his day, he 
would have done so in terms not unlike Christie's. Of course, he would have given 
the analysis an expressly materialist flavour, but almost certainly he would have left 
Christie's fundamental theoretical insights largely intact. The focus would have been 
upon incorporating, extending and deepening the Christie thesis in terms of the 
Marxist method rather than upon dismissing it for its non-Marxist genesis. The 
Marxist theory of law takes the commodity as its premise and comprehends legal 
relations as the form necessarily taken by commodity relations, and the legal subject 
as the necessary alter ego of the commodity owner. It is, in this connection, 
indisputable that Pashukanis would have comprehended restorative justice in 
proprietary terms. He understood crime and punishment as exchange transactions 
and invariably would have applied this insight to the analysis of restorative justice. 
Of course, the commodity is at the heart of every exchange relation and would have 
had to be central to the Pashukanist comprehension of restorative justice also. 
 
7 Pashukanis contra Christie 
 
Despite their mutualities, there remains a series of cardinal differences between 
Pashukanis and Christie. The divergences stem directly and inevitably from the fact 
that the former proceeds from a Marxist perspective and the latter not. This section 
considers three major issues in relation to which Pashukanism is opposed resolutely 
to the stance taken by Christie in the construction of his proprietary theory of 
restorative justice. 
 
The first issue concerns the legal form itself. Notwithstanding its centrality to his 
general theory, Pashukanis is an unrelenting critic of the legal form and theorises its 
eventual disappearance from human relations, along with the commodity form. For 
him, the key to the comprehension of both forms and of the relationship between 
them lies in their historicity. The lives of both are connected intimately with the life 
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of the capitalist mode of production, and their demise is expected to follow the 
demise of capitalism. Pashukanis considers that law proper is a capitalist relation and 
he looks forward to the installation, in the wake of the emergence of a post-capitalist 
social order, of a world in which the legal form has no purchase, one in which 
human relations are not structured by the juridical perspective. He comprehends the 
legal form in historically specific terms, as an attribute of capitalist society, and 
anticipates that the next historical era in the evolution of human society will be a 
post-legal one.86 
 
Christie, by contrast, displays no discomfort with or antipathy to the notion of the 
juridical, and takes the legal form for granted as an aspect of human relations. What 
is more, his position entails the re-conceptualisation of criminal law as a direct 
materialisation of the commodity form, from which is derived the legal form. As 
noted above, his submission that criminal conflicts are forms of property amounts to 
an argument for the commodification of crime and punishment. Indeed, it is an 
argument for intensifying the process of commodification, with a view to 
transforming the criminal law landscape so that the interrelation between the legal 
form and the commodity form is manifest. This is the juridical approach par 
excellence. However radical Christie may be in relation to the conventional notion of 
criminal justice, such radicality does not extend to the legal form itself. He presumes 
its permanent existence and embraces it as a natural and inevitable dimension of 
human social organisation, past, present and future. The question of the historicity 
of the juridical falls outside the ambit of his theory. The future of the legal form does 
not feature in his theoretical formulations. This is a crucial omission which, as will 
become clear later, imports into the restorative justice project a quite disabling 
contradiction. 
 
The second significant divergence between Pashukanis and Christie concerns their 
approaches to the fundamental juridical notion of legal subjectivity. It will be recalled 
that Pashukanis seeks the genesis of legal subjectivity in the commodity economy, 
                                                 
86 For Pashukanis Law and Marxism 133, "the legal form only encompasses us within its narrow 
horizon for the time being. It exists for the sole purpose of being utterly spent." 
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and specifically in the imperatives of commodity exchange. For him, the legal form is 
a homologue of the commodity form, with the former being the ideal superstructural 
expression of the latter. Legal subjectivity is derivative. Its existence is stipulated by 
the perquisites of the commodity economy. The legal subject emerges as the 
actualisation of the commodity owner. They are similar in form but remain 
conceptually distinct, with the latter taking analytical precedence over the former. 
Besides being historically given, the contingent character of legal subjectivity is 
prescribed also by the philosophical materialism which informs Pashukanis's general 
theory of law. Since the Marxist epistemology stipulates the juridical concepts to be 
superstructural categories, it follows that their analysis ought to proceed from the 
material conditions of their genesis and development. 
 
Christie inverts Pashukanis, and hence the materialist premise. He begins with the 
legal subject and ends with the commodity owner. For him, legal subjectivity, if not 
a natural condition, is certainly a prior condition. Pashukanis derives legal 
subjectivity from the structure of the commodity economy, and hence the legal 
subject from the commodity owner, whereas Christie presumes the timeless legal 
subject and, in the conditions of "industrialised large-scale society", seeks to re-
make him as a proprietor, that is, as a commodity owner. In other words, the legal 
subject becomes a commodity owner by virtue of the commodification of the crime 
to which he is a party. The former determines while the latter is determined. Both 
victim and offender become owners because they are legal subjects. Christie thus 
proceeds from a presumption of legal subjectivity. Such a presumption associates 
the Christie thesis with philosophical idealism. Proponents of restorative justice are 
quick to proffer historical justifications for their project. Yet they make but little 
effort to uncover the historical origins of the foundational juridical concept of legal 
subjectivity. Christie, too, avoids this avenue of investigation and embraces the legal 
subject as a suprahistorical universal. Thereby he adopts a variant of the idealist 
postulate.87 
                                                 
87 Christie comprehends the relationship between the legal subject and the commodity owner as an 
identity and not as a homology. He transforms the crime itself into property, collapsing the 
conceptual distinction between the legal subject and the commodity owner. This theoretical 
fabrication entails the most complete unity of the legal subject and the commodity owner. 
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The role of the state, as a public power, is the source of the third major item of 
contention between Pashukanis and Christie. Pashukanis analyses the criminal law 
as a branch of public law which is premised as securely, if not as obviously, as 
private law upon the exchange transactions of the commodity economy. He seeks to 
explain criminal justice on the basis of his general theory of law. He attempts to 
theorise the criminal law, as a public law phenomenon, in terms of the relationship 
between the legal form and the commodity form. As a Marxist, Pashukanis 
comprehends the necessity for the state to administer criminal justice in class society 
in general and capitalist society in particular. The public nature of crime and 
criminality is thus an issue for him only insofar as it needs to be harmonised with a 
theory of law which presumes the genesis of the legal form to be essentially 
"private". Pashukanis therefore takes as given the fact that the criminal law is public 
law, to which the state is necessarily a party. He accepts that in a commodity 
economy, criminal justice is perforce state justice. His concern is to develop his 
theory from its origins in private law to encompass also those branches of the law 
which are generally accepted to be public, foremost amongst which is criminal law. 
In a word, Pashukanis's project in respect of crime and punishment is to discover 
and clarify the nature of the legal form, qua public law form, in the context of an 
economy of generalised commodity production. The capitalist state is an 
indispensable feature of this project. 
 
Christie's theory of restorative justice is anti-statist. He advocates a radical 
reconstruction of the criminal justice system at the expense of the capitalist state, 
which is the prime protagonist in the current system. However, the capitalist state is 
the pre-eminent institution of the political organisation and social cohesion of the 
bourgeoisie as the ruling class. Its proposed eviction from the criminal justice system 
cannot be summary. Such a campaign has to be justified either in terms which 
affirm the social relations of production for which the capitalist state stands as 
                                                                                                                                                        
Commodification of the crime melds the subjectivity and proprietorship of each party. These 
attributes become definitively fused in the restorative process, to spawn the perfect subject-
owner, for whom legal subjectivity and ownership are conterminous. The ambit of the idealist 
postulate is thus extended, to include the immortality of the commodity. 
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guarantor or in terms which anticipate the transcendence of these relations. 
 
Christie opts for the former road. He never takes issue with the legitimacy of the 
capitalist mode of production or its structural attributes. He accepts as 
uncontroversial the existence and persistence of capitalist social relations of 
production. For him, one may say, capitalism is a given. It is a constant. When he 
postulates the transformation of criminal conflicts into property he means capitalist 
property. He is concerned only to question the legitimacy of the criminal justice 
system within the parameters of the capitalist system. He knows, as do most, that 
the state-centred criminal justice system has lost the bulk of whatever legitimacy it 
once may have enjoyed. He proposes to rekindle that legitimacy by shifting its locus 
from the state to property, from the public to the private. 
 
Christie's ambition to privatise the criminal episode is premised upon an 
acknowledgement of an ontological connection between the criminal law and the 
commodity form. Such privatisation would make clear the commodified character of 
crime and punishment as exchange interactions between property owners in the 
community. The crime becomes a commodity to be disposed of in the community 
marketplace. And state punishment gives way to the restorative sanction, 
representing the outcome of the exchange transaction between the victim and the 
offender, according to the principle of equivalence.88 If restorative justice is to be 
the key to solving the crisis of criminality, then the key to restorative justice is the 
complete privatisation of crime and punishment, in the sense that the state has no 
                                                 
88 Like all proponents of restorative justice, Christie rejects retributionism. Indeed, antipathy to 
retributionism has acquired the status of an article of faith in the lore of restorative justice. Yet 
retributionism is the only conventional theory of punishment which embraces overtly the 
principle of equivalence, the self-same principle to which restorative justice is wedded 
theoretically. The restorative process and sanction are about restoring the status quo ante. 
Supporters of restorative justice accept that, prior to the crime, the relationship between the 
offender and the victim was one as between two equal legal subjects. In other words, 
equivalence is the norm which the crime has disturbed and which the restorative process must 
reinstate. If retributionism is about equivalent requital, then restorative justice is about 
equivalent recompense. Thus, despite their supposed contradictions, there is much more that 
restorative justice shares with retributionism than the proponents of the former would care to 
admit. 
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say in the disposition of criminal matters.89 This, of course, implies a radical break 
with criminal justice. It is his unambiguous anti-statism which separates Christie's 
restorative justice from conventional criminal justice (and from partial restorative 
justice). However, as will be argued later, it is this self-same anti-statism which 
constitutes perhaps the biggest obstacle to the success of the comprehensive 
restorative justice project. 
 
Of course, as a Marxist, Pashukanis too is anti-statist. But whereas Christie objects 
to the state as a party to the criminal justice system and theorises restorative justice 
as privatised justice, Pashukanis understands the state to be a necessary party to 
capitalist criminal justice and hence that such justice is necessarily public justice. 
Pashukanis's anti-statism is of a different order to Christie's in that he objects to the 
very existence of the state as a public authority in society. Christie advocates the 
demise of the capitalist state as a "stakeholder" in the criminal justice system; 
Pashukanis advocates the demise of the state as a social institution. The one wants 
to restrict the ambit of state power; the other wants to destroy it. The one accepts 
capitalist society but seeks to replace its criminal justice system; the other accepts 
the criminal justice system as a necessary aspect of capitalist society but seeks 
replace that society.90 
 
It may be concluded, then, that Pashukanism is decisively anti-Christie in its attitude 
towards the three critical matters of the legal form, legal subjectivity and the role of 
                                                 
89 Advocates of restorative justice appear to embrace the privatised notion of crime in the same 
way that Thompson Whigs and Hunters 266 embraces the public notion of human rights, that is, 
as an "unqualified human good". 
90 It is well known that Marxism is opposed not only to the capitalist state but to the state as an 
institutional dimension of human social relations. Marxism teaches that every state is a class 
state which is dedicated to the defence and reproduction of extant social relations of production. 
The capitalist state, whatever its form, is comprehended primarily as a bourgeois institution 
which is complicit in and is routinely in the van of the oppression and exploitation of the 
dominated classes, especially the working class. The classical Marxist attitude towards the 
capitalist state is that it must be destroyed by way of a working class revolution. Marxists 
anticipate that socialism will succeed capitalism and that the capitalist state will be replaced by a 
proletarian state, that is, the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie will yield to the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. However, the latter is conceived to be transitional in the sense that it is expected to 
wither away as society makes its world-historic transition to classlessness. See generally Lenin 
State and Revolution; Mandel Marxist Theory of the State; Miliband The State in Capitalist 
Society. 
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the state. Collectively, these contradictions apprehend the fundamentals of the 
Pashukanist critique of the proprietary theory of restorative justice. 
 
8 An impossible dream 
 
Christie's theory entails a radical rejection of the formal statist criminal justice 
system which hitherto had been emblematic of capitalism. If a criminal conflict is a 
form of common capitalist property, then the state has no legitimate interest in its 
resolution. The disposition of a criminal conflict is then within the competence of its 
joint owners, all of whom enjoy proprietorship in the conflict as an individual right. 
The Christie thesis implies that property brings justice. The construction of the 
criminal conflict as property is posited as the key to satisfying the claims of the 
direct parties to a responsive criminal justice system. The proprietary route to justice 
is important enough to impose upon unwilling offenders. When it comes to crime 
and punishment, we shall be property owners one and all, and our transformation 
into property owners will be an enforced one, if necessary. 
 
From a Marxist perspective, the Christie postulate is a sophisticated attempt to 
devise a solution to the capitalist crisis of criminality in terms which proceed from an 
acceptance of capitalist social relations of production as legitimate. It is, in other 
words, an exercise in capitalist reconstruction, considered necessary to deal with a 
problem which has overrun the extant regulatory arrangements. In this regard 
Christie's thesis may be comprehended as an expression of that central ideal of petit 
bourgeois political philosophy, namely, the ideal of a society of property owners. For 
the petit bourgeois, property is both his gateway to the bourgeois world and his 
bulwark against the threat of being condemned to a proletarian existence. Christie 
raises this middle-class neurosis to the level of a theory. He would replace the state 
with that which the state exists to warrant. He would substitute the central juridical 
feature of capitalism for its central political feature in the constitution of the criminal 
justice system. While reducing the sway of the latter he would extend significantly 
that of the former, to include criminal conflicts. Christie is offering a solution to the 
capitalist crisis of criminality which, to be sure, spurns all conventional assumptions 
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about the composition of the criminal justice system but which, as surely, embraces 
all the conventional assumptions about the composition of the social system. 
 
If all roads lead to property then, in Pashukanist terms, all property leads to the 
commodity. In the capitalist mode of production, the commodity is the elemental cell 
of production, and property relations are the juridical form taken by commodity 
relations. To widen the ambit of capitalist property is to widen the sphere of 
influence of the commodity. Thus, when Christie construes justice in terms of 
property he is performing an act of commodification in respect of legal relations. The 
process of commodification is an exercise in internal colonisation which extends and 
deepens the proprietary content and culture of the capitalist mode of production at 
every step. When Christie presents capitalist property as a catholicon in his theory of 
restorative justice, objectively he is succumbing to the hegemony of the juridical 
worldview of the bourgeoisie. His theory displays an obeisance to the ubiquity and 
perceived omnipotence of capitalist property. It is true that he expresses some form 
of dissatisfaction with the limitations encoded in the idea of private property. But he 
is concerned to liberate capitalist property from these limitations, to broaden its 
reach beyond the exclusively material and private, and thereby to ratify the kingdom 
of property. However, there is no logical link, not even in formal logical terms, 
between the supreme prestige enjoyed by property in the capitalist world and 
according property the supreme status of a theoretical panacea. Such a link can be 
made only on the assumption, which would be an ontological choice, that capitalism 
and its worldview, even if they are not desirable, are certainly not impugnable. 
 
Ideologically, Christie's notion of conflicts as property and his ambition to see us all 
become proprietors, at least of our criminal conflicts, anticipated the precepts of so-
called popular capitalism which gained currency in the 1980s.91 Indeed, his thesis 
may be comprehended as a juridical representation of popular capitalist doctrine. In 
                                                 
91 Popular capitalism, inter alia, promotes the idea of a stakeholder society in which everybody, 
regardless of class affiliation, enjoys ready access to the benefits of the free market. It 
foregrounds privatisation and deregulation as routes to financial prosperity for all who would 
have it. In a word, it offers everybody a stake in capitalism as a means of defusing class conflict 
and of guaranteeing the orderly reproduction of the mode of production. For a detailed 
exposition of the tenets of popular capitalism see Redwood Popular Capitalism 24-45. 
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the same way as the ideologues of this doctrine promise that capitalism can be a 
people's mode of production, so Christie promises that criminal justice can be a 
people's mode of justice. The solution to the capitalist economic crisis, according to 
the popular capitalists, is to invite all of us to participate in the magic of the free 
market. The solution to the capitalist crisis of criminality, according to Christie, is to 
offer all of us title in a populist proprietary regime of criminal conflicts. 
 
What is more, it appears that Christie perceives that the remedial attributes of 
capitalist property go beyond the problem of crime and in fact may rank as a crucial 
factor in solving the problem of capitalist alienation.92 From his discussion of the 
structural theft of criminal conflicts it is evident that Christie is fully cognisant of the 
alienated and alienating nature of capitalist social relations of production. Following 
MacPherson's faith in the liberating and humanising potentialities of capitalist 
property, he suggests that his own proprietary theory of conflict may contain the 
ingredients for vanquishing alienation. He posits that "much of our trouble stems 
from killed neighbourhoods or killed local communities", and considers that the 
transformation of criminal conflicts into property "is intended as a vitaliser for 
neighbourhoods".93 For Christie, then, his proprietary thesis not only holds the key to 
solving the capitalist crisis of criminality but also constitutes a way out of the 
structural sources of capitalist alienation. This is a large claim. Of course, it sidesteps 
the larger prior question: why are our communities and local neighbourhoods 
"killed"? The answer is painfully obvious: they are the victims of the exploitation, 
oppression and alienation inscribed in the social relations of the capitalist mode of 
production. Yet Christie would rely upon an expanded notion of capitalist property, 
the juridical heart and ideational soul of the capitalist mode of production, as their 
salvation. He proffers his conceptual transformation as the begetter of a social 
transformation. 
 
Marxism considers that capitalism is a decadent mode of production which does not 
and cannot possess the resources required to solve its own structural crises. Indeed, 
                                                 
92 Here Christie appears to concur with the argument of MacPherson Democratic Theory 138-140 
that property, ultimately, ought to entail the right to a fully human life. 
93 Christie 1977 British Journal of Criminology 12. 
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it became necessary long ago to dismantle capitalism as a mode of production to 
prevent it from eventually plunging all humanity into social anarchy, economic 
bedlam and cultural barbarism. Christie demurs. Despite his concerns about the 
inequities which it has produced, he continues to believe that capitalism can offer 
equal opportunities to all. Despite his attack upon the role of the capitalist state in 
the criminal justice system, he continues to believe that the capitalist system is able 
to provide a justice which is properly responsive to human needs and concerns. 
Despite his radicality, he shares the juridical worldview and continues to believe that 
capitalism is able to solve its own crises. In the end, Christie remains a true believer 
in the reformability of capitalism. 
 
Needless to say, Marxism condemns such an attachment to the notion of a good 
capitalism on both political and philosophical grounds. It is a basic Marxist postulate 
that capitalism is class-riven and that every social change of any significance, 
including that which Christie would like to see, is rooted ultimately in the material 
conditions of class struggle. Christie takes a supra-class position and asks us to 
accept a conceptual transformation in the nature of criminal conflicts as the well-
spring of a New Jerusalem of criminal justice. However, in the capitalist context, a 
general appeal which seeks to avoid class distinctions invariably becomes an appeal 
to the good sense of the ruling class. 
 
Unfortunately, Christie reckons without the class sensibilities of the bourgeoisie. As a 
ruling class, the bourgeoisie does not care for schemes which make inroads into its 
power and prerogatives, as Christie's would. It has no patience for plans which 
would have it relinquish one of its most significant power bases in the hope of not 
losing society further "opportunities for norm-clarification". The bourgeoisie supports 
and promotes popular capitalism because it offers a method of implicating all classes 
directly in the affirmation of capitalist social relations of production and in the 
defence of the valorisation of capital. It will not do the same for restorative justice 
because it has little interest in creating "pedagogical possibilities". As the ruling 
class, it is concerned with prescribing norms for the dominated classes rather than 
with engaging them in a process of "norm-clarification". 
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Christie makes the capital mistake of assuming that what is good for capitalism in 
the economic sphere is good for it in other spheres also. It never has been part of 
the agenda of the capitalist class to transform everybody into property owners. That 
has been the dream of the middle classes. The bourgeoisie is the capitalist 
proprietor and knows that the middle-class aspiration of universal proprietorship is a 
pipe-dream. Popular capitalism is really about increasing the property holdings of the 
bourgeoisie, not about making capitalist property accessible to the other classes. 
The popular capitalist advocacy of privatisation is really about extending bourgeois 
ownership of the means of production, not about sharing such ownership with the 
proletariat or the petite bourgeoisie. Deregulation is really about opening more 
avenues for extracting surplus value from the proletariat, not about opening the 
economy to proletarian or popular control. Christie believes, idealistically, that the 
bourgeoisie will take seriously the petit bourgeois project and create a society of 
property owners in relation to criminal conflicts. He supposes, hopefully, that the 
bourgeoisie will consent to the privatisation and deregulation of the criminal justice 
system as easily and enthusiastically as it has consented to the privatisation and 
deregulation of the economy. He presumes, optimistically, that the bourgeoisie can 
transcend its class limitations and agree to make its justice as popular as it has 
sought to make the idea of capitalism itself. 
 
Property is a social relation for the appropriation of material values. Invariably, the 
property relation is expressed and lived juridically, as proprietary rights in the object 
of appropriation.94 The bourgeoisie understands property in terms of entitlements to 
appropriate value: its ownership of the means of production confers upon it the legal 
right to appropriate the surplus-value produced by the proletariat. Privatisation of 
state assets is a means of increasing such rights of appropriation. Commodification 
of relations traditionally outside the commodity circuit is a means of extending 
property as appropriation. However, the transformation of criminal conflicts into 
property has nothing to do with the appropriation of value. This is the basic reason 
why the bourgeoisie will not embrace Christie's thesis, given that it also entails the 
                                                 
94 See Suvorova and Romanov What is Property? 35. 
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expulsion of its state. Christie misunderstands what property means for capital. It 
enjoys so much prestige because it is the key to capital accumulation, not because it 
is a cure-all for social problems. Christie wants capitalist property to be what it is not 
or, rather, what capitalism will not have it be. That, in the end, is the practical 
undoing of his theory.95 
 
9 Conclusion 
 
If comprehensive restorative justice, as conceived by Christie, has a theoretical 
watchword, it is privatisation.96 This notion is at the root of the confrontation 
between restorative and criminal justice.97 It is the theoretical postulate which 
imbues restorative justice with its anti-statism. A crime cannot be a private affair 
unless it is conceptualised as a form of property. Privatisation entails property. It is 
an inherently proprietary notion which summates in private property.98 Only that 
which may be owned can be privatised. Privatisation reduces public assets and 
resources to private ownership and presumes property to be an aboriginal and 
natural human relation. Privatisation which does not produce private property is a 
conceptual non-starter. It is therefore necessary that the notion of privatised 
criminal justice, to which the restorative justice project is committed, be founded 
theoretically upon a proprietary conception of criminality. Absent privatisation, 
restorative justice is emasculated; and absent private property, privatisation is 
                                                 
95 As a theory of comprehensive restorative justice (which it intends to be), Christie's is thus a 
practical non-starter. However, it is arguable that all partial restorative justice programmes 
amount to the partial implementation of Christie's thesis. In other words, it is possible to 
comprehend the conflicts which are resolved by these programmes in proprietary terms. Since 
they are mostly minor conflicts, they may be seen as forms of personal property which are not 
pivotal to the capitalist property regime, and thus may be removed without ado to the 
jurisdiction of restorative justice. I am indebted to Dirk van Zyl Smit for this insight. 
96 Of course, partial restorative justice also posits a privatised justice within its sphere of operation. 
Although it accepts the overall supremacy of public criminal justice, it does expect the state to 
withdraw from those areas of criminality which are designated for restoration. This partial 
privatisation is subsumed theoretically within the complete privatisation required by 
comprehensive restorative justice. 
97 The first target of restorative justice is retribution. However, this is a strategic manoeuvre which 
derives from the theoretical commitment to privatisation. Retribution exemplifies the penal 
philosophy of statist justice. It is the natural target of choice for restorative justice. 
98 Here the concept of private property must be understood in its extended version to include non-
material common property in which the co-owners enjoy individual rights. The same applies to 
private ownership. 
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incomprehensible. Once again, all roads lead to property. 
 
In this connection, Christie's thesis is primordial. And its deficiencies 
notwithstanding, this thesis contains the key to a materialist understanding of the 
theoretical precepts of restorative justice. From the Marxist perspective, Christie's 
achievement has been to pierce the veil of appearance and reveal the material core 
of the doctrine of restorative justice to be a proprietary one. Justice can never be 
higher than right, and right, in the final analysis, as Marx reminds us, "can never be 
higher than the economic structure of society and its cultural development 
conditioned thereby".99 Despite his acquiescence in idealism, Christie comprehends 
this fundamental materialist postulate. 
 
The proprietary theory of restorative justice elaborated by the non-Marxist Christie 
affirms the general theory of law mapped out by the Marxist Pashukanis. The 
relationship is, however, not a reciprocal one, for Christie never engages, in any 
sustained way, either the material roots of the juridical moment or the historical 
specificity of the idea of legal subjectivity. His remarkable insight into the 
fundamentally proprietary nature of bourgeois political economy notwithstanding, 
Christie has not comprehended the real relationship between the commodity form 
and the legal form, and the implications of this relationship for the restorative justice 
project. From the Marxist perspective this is an omission which impoverishes the 
theory thus produced and leads it into a cul-de-sac of contradiction. The practical 
result is the somewhat optimistic but decidedly utopian belief that capitalism's crisis 
of criminality may be solved by privatising its criminal justice system. It is a belief 
which evidences a signal failure to grasp the unavoidably statist nature of capitalist 
criminal justice. 
 
Despite the intersections between the proprietary theory of restorative justice and 
the Marxist general theory of law, there remains an unbridgeable chasm between 
the two. Restorative justice is about harnessing the legal form to its cause to 
supersede the criminal justice system. Marxism is about confronting the legal form in 
                                                 
99 Marx "Critique of the Gotha Programme" 531. 
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order to supersede it. Restorative justice is about removing the state from its 
supervisory role in the criminal justice process. The Marxist analysis of law is about 
the total destruction of the bourgeois state (and the withering away of its proletarian 
successor). Restorative justice is about turning all of us into men and women of 
property. Marxism is about waging unrelenting struggle against the regime of 
bourgeois property. Restorative justice is about commodification. Marxism is the 
mortal enemy of the commodity economy. 
 
Be that as it may, there is a revolutionary core to the comprehensive restorative 
justice project which Christie theorises. The contradictions between partial 
restorative justice and criminal justice are non-antagonistic and concern primarily 
the delineation of the sphere of operation of each. By contrast, the contradictions 
between comprehensive restorative justice and criminal justice are antagonistic, in 
the sense that the one becomes or remains viable to the extent that the other 
remains undeveloped or degenerates. They are mortal enemies. The new kind of 
justice which is envisaged by the Christie thesis may well be the kind which accords 
with the legal morality of socialism. The idea of neighbourhood courts which are run 
by ordinary people and in which argument and evidence are not straitjacketed by 
juridical contrivances is not inconsistent with the socialist perspective.100 Capitalism 
can accommodate and co-opt partial restorative justice with ease. It cannot 
countenance the idea and possibility of comprehensive restorative justice. It seems, 
then, that the realisation of the revolutionary potentialities of restorative justice in its 
comprehensive aspect will require a socialist revolution against the hegemony of 
                                                 
100 When the Bolsheviks came to power in the Soviet Union they quickly initiated a revolution in law 
which included a profound transformation of the criminal justice system. The first step of the 
revolutionary regime was to dismantle the pre-revolutionary courts and replace them with 
revolutionary People's Courts. The constitution and operation of the revolutionary courts evinced 
a discernible restorative flavour. Elements such as significant lay participation and powers, the 
rejection of retribution as the purpose of punishment and the ready reliance upon extra-legal 
factors in the resolution of legal disputes all may be comprehended as prefigurations of 
restorative justice. To be sure, Bolshevik criminal justice, as the criminal justice of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, was eminently statist. But it also presaged the justice of a future 
communist society in which the state, as an institution of class rule, had withered into 
insignificance. The Bolshevik innovations in criminal justice portended a restorative justice which 
transcended the commodity form and its attendant principle of equivalence. For further 
discussion of the institutions of Bolshevik revolutionary justice see Berman Justice in the USSR 
31; Stuchka "The Old and New Court" 187-189; Butler Russian Law 149-150, 577-588; 
Schlesinger Soviet Legal Theory 60-73. 
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capitalism and the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. In other words, if our future 
justice is to be restorative, our future society would probably have to be socialist. 
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